After COP30, where should we look to for global climate leadership?

19 December 2025

With the US absent from the UN climate conference in Belém, Brazil, it was a moment for other nations to step up, say the guests on December’s Planet Possible podcast.

As the dust settles on the COP30 climate summit in Belem, Brazil, discussion on the Planet Possible podcast turns to the shifting geopolitics of climate leadership and what it could mean for future generations.

Host Niki Roach is joined by two experts in this space, Dr Clare Richardson-Barlow, a political economist with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region, and Richard Beardsworth, professor of international politics at the University of Leeds and principal fellow at the Priestley Centre for Climate Futures.

If you enjoy this taster, you can listen to the full conversation here or search for Planet Possible in your favourite podcast app. Follow the podcast to stay updated on our monthly deep dives into pressing environmental challenges.

Now, over to Niki, Clare and Richard…

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Niki Roach: Richard, tell us about the context in which COP30 took place.

Richard Beardsworth: We're very well aware in the last few years, and particularly since the second Trump administration, with its very clear agenda, that the multilateral order that was set up after the Second World War is in question. It's in question on several fronts.

The COP process, the Conference of the Parties, that whole process within the United Nations Framework for Climate Convention, is a multilateral process applied to the climate. Given the fact that global emissions are continuing to increase and that we are likely overshooting 1.5 (which was the target temperature for the end of this century) probably by the first two years into the next decade, there's a real sense that this multilateral set of negotiations over the last 30 years has failed, that it is unable to bring emissions reduction and as a result, its mitigation strategy is awry.

Within that general context, the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement, which is what COP30 has been, to celebrate in some ways and take forward the agreement of all countries party to the UNFCCC Convention, that agreement to take temperatures down to 1.5 if possible (but between at least 2 degrees and 1.5) becomes all the more difficult, given where we are. And COP30 was really there, under the Brazilian presidency, to establish the possibility or not of whether climate multilateralism could continue. So in that sense for me, it's been a very important COP, whatever actually the outcome is at the moment, because it's testing where we are in this difficult geopolitical context, where we are around climate multilateralism in particular, but also in terms of being a test for multilateralism and the politics of multilateralism in general.

NR: Clare, your expertise is Asia Pacific, with a real focus on China. What have your reflections been on COP?

Clare Richardson-Barlow: Well, within the context of what Richard has discussed, which really lays out a clear picture around the policy and geopolitical importance, this COP also came at a time where we're moving past easy wins. So we're at a stage of setting long-term goals and really addressing how we can confront some of the major challenges, particularly while we're experiencing climate overshoots, rising inequality and geopolitical tensions. And a lot of that is really present and amplified in the Asia Pacific, and China, of course, is playing a role in a number of those issues.

So we're also seeing within that context that progress is uneven. So some countries are accelerating their transitions and others are still expanding fossil fuel capacity. And many are simply struggling to finance basic adaptation.

So COP is really a test of whether or not global cooperation can keep pace with climate reality. So for me, I was really hoping to see some clarity, and what I've been referring to as courage in financing, whether that's a roadmap or specific plans as opposed to just lip service. And then also serious conversations about overshoot and justice. And we can discuss whether or not some of those things actually happened.

NR: Were there any chinks of positivity or are you left feeling a little disheartened?

CRB: There's definitely positivity in that we saw a coordinated, agreed upon movement among emerging markets and what's often referred to as the Global South or developing countries. There was a lot of service given to justice and a just transition and coordination and monitoring of what that might look like. But of course, the plans don't necessarily at this stage show us what's going to happen over the next year.

And I know that there is definitely some real criticism of what some of the mechanisms and roadmaps that were discussed might actually look like and how they might be implemented. And so it's sort of a cop out to say this, but both positive and negative outcomes from COP. We saw coordination in voices, but then also coordination in criticism of some of the solutions that have been proposed.

NR: Richard, I'd be keen to hear some of your reflections on what did you actually see at COP30 and what does that mean moving forward?

RB: What one saw at COP30 was a Brazilian presidency very much saying, “This is the 10th anniversary, we can no longer negotiate. We don't need to negotiate anymore. We need to implement. This is an implementation COP.” So the bar was set really quite high because then everyone's looking to see, right, well, where is the delivery?

In fact, what we saw was very much a negotiating COP, particularly around what we've all heard of at the end, these two blocks with regard to the proposed roadmap to a fossil fuel phase out or exit. It was a really important moment trying to go back to COP28 and the overall United Arab Emirates decision, despite the fact that it was housed in a petro state, to mention for the first time ever in 30 years of COPs, that there has to be a transition away from fossil fuels in a just and equitable manner.

That wasn't mentioned in COP29 in Baku last year, and there was a very strong pressure to bring it back in as an absolute condition of mitigation targets and the way to get there. So as implementation, since 80% of greenhouse gas emissions are produced by fossil fuels, the only way we're going to get to these targets, [limiting temperature rise to] between 1.5 and 2 degrees, with an overall floor of 1.5 if possible, the only way to do it is to phase out fossil fuels. Everyone is utterly aware of this. So the fact that at the end, there were these two blocks: 80-odd countries in the final cover decision – the cover decision is a political summary of where the conference has ended and is an important statement, even though it is legally non-binding – a reference to a roadmap to scheduled fossil fuel exit in a fair, fast and financially funded manner, and 80 countries who didn't even want that referenced, who wanted to go back to before COP28 in some ways.

They didn't want even a reference to fossil fuels. You literally had almost two teams up against each other, with 30 countries moving on particular issues one way or the other, but not making it clear where they were.

In some ways that was disappointing not to have something taken up as a delivery COP around what is the major cause of the increase in temperatures in our post-industrial era and where there is going to the question of justice, historical responsibility from the North. That there wasn't any give on that is less a cop out in some ways, although I love that term for us here, than the fact that what we saw basically was the fault lines became very clear. There are countries wanting to lead forward towards a scheduled fossil fuel exit, and there are countries that want to block in any possible way that movement forward. And there are countries within that block of 80 who were against reference to fossil fuels, who don't want to necessarily block like Saudi Arabia or Russia or Bolivia did during the negotiations, they simply do not see it as fair for them in terms of poverty reduction and sustainable development. They do not see it as fair that they are prescribed a schedule through these negotiations when they are not historically responsible for climate change. The country that led on that was India.

So I think what's really interesting for many of us about COP30 is you saw at the end a clear division and then within each block, a set of different reasons for why countries are for a road map to the exit, or do not want reference to fossil fuels at all for the moment. And that is, both in terms of climate diplomacy and in terms of climate leadership, for me, the real issue that we have to take forward. I think it's a platform for new innovative leadership around climate and that is a good thing, even though it was disappointing not to see an agreement. But gosh, if there'd be an agreement, that would have been an extraordinary thing.

Let me not monopolise, but very quickly, there were platforms set up, like the Action Agenda, like the Belém 1.5 Mission Agenda, agendas for delivery for both negotiating actors and for non-negotiating actors. Business, cities, global and domestic civil societies, that's within the Action Agenda, to look at mitigation and adaptation within sectors, transport, agriculture, power and so on and so forth. And that Action Agenda is actually very exciting. So there are platforms, despite the blockage, for ongoing action which work within the Paris Agreement.

NR: Clare, given what Richard said about that shifting global leadership on climate, where does China fit?

CRB: There's definitely a dialogue around China's role as the largest emitter globally, and then what that looks like in terms of its leadership and how it responds to those emissions. China has undeniably filled a vacuum that the United States has left open by not engaging. And I think that it's really important to point out that looking at China in terms of largest emissions is really only one part of the picture.

Its role in leadership in climate change, both at the COP, but also globally, day to day, is really important and requires three clarifications: the first is that we're looking at a per capita emissions issue; [then] there's also historical emissions; and then there's China's dual role. And that's the piece that I'd like to pick apart. China is simultaneously the largest emitter and the largest investor in renewable energy and the largest manufacturer of clean technology. And so in terms of leadership, whether it's stepping up at COP, taking on particular targets, or also walking the walk and talking the talk, it is pushing progress in the climate sustainable development space.

The scale of China's build of clean energy is extraordinary. It's installing more solar capacity each year than the rest of the world combined. Now that doesn't excuse its coal dependence, but it does show a more complex reality than we might see in traditional media narratives. When we're talking about Chinese leadership, if you were to do a Google search today for ‘China COP30’, a lot would come up around, is China presenting itself as a leader? Is China filling this space? And often, is China the problem? And I would say in response to that, China is central to the problem, and it's also central to the solution. And in COP, we saw China step forward for the Global South and emerging markets, and support conversations and initiatives that are coming from other emerging and developing countries, and that's really important. China is both pushing for those countries that feel they may have a smaller voice, and it is also pushing forward for what it deems as possible targets and adjustments and I think that's really important.

NR: Is it in that camp that Richard talked about around wanting to exit from fossil fuels?

CRB: It's definitely trying to take on the [position of] let's move away [from fossil fuels] and transition in a way that doesn't leave our people behind. I think it's more complex than just being for or against. China really is a good illustrator of the challenge for emerging markets: how do we engage in climate change mitigation in a way that allows us to continue to benefit development and bring populations out of poverty, improving day-to-day quality of life? That requires electricity access, which requires the generation and the utilisation of a variety of energy mechanisms of which fossil fuels is just one. Richard, what do you think there?

RB: I really agree with you. In terms of leadership, I think China was quite quiet at COP30. With the US absent (although there were a lot of people from the US delegation there, but only in a private capacity; so a lot of Americans were there at sub-national level, but also members of the delegation, but obviously they weren't there as a party), one lacked a coordinating mechanism, as it were. Where climate leadership has been really important, when it has been taken up by the US and China, and I think particularly of the two years going into the Paris Agreement and the kinds of commitments they made publicly in the two years running up, allowed for confidence in the Paris Agreement. And many people think that actually without their co-leadership, the Paris Agreement would not have been possible politically.

What we saw at COP30, I think, is the importance of the US absence. For some in the South, it was quite nice not to have the US there in many ways, because it allowed a shift more to Global South leadership. And I think that's very important. But as a result of the US not being there, any sense of climate leadership, assuming the mantle at a global level from China, was also absent. That cooperation between the two of them has disintegrated. And China is not yet ready to assume the mantle of global leadership itself. History is a long process for China. It will take its time, even though clearly the urgency of the climate requires much speedier global climate leadership. I don't think China is going to offer it. But I think the kind of leadership it does offer, the leadership for countries in the South, is that it can deliver, it has that capacity. It is leadership by capacity. It can deliver at a scale that no other country or coalition of countries can deliver at the moment with regard to the green energy transition. And that is very important. What it lacks within that is an ambition to lead for everyone. It just doesn't want to, doesn't see itself in that position. And so it's much more transactional leadership that's going on. I think one saw that there in COP30 around the energy transition. Clare, come back to me if you think I'm wrong.

CRB: No, I totally agree. And I think you've highlighted it, whether purposefully or inadvertently, a really important point about China: and that is that China has been burned in this space, in the global narrative so significantly, that stepping forward in a way where they say explicitly, ‘We are going to lead’, doesn't serve them at the moment. But stepping forward in a way that is sort of silent leadership does. I heard another expert give a really good quote that I'm going to steal: they're from the Asia Society, Li Shuo. They said the most important voice at COP isn't necessarily the one with the loudest microphone. It's the one that is doing the work behind the scenes and investing. And China really is in that way embodying that at the most recent COP. Not necessarily being the loudest voice in negotiations, but for example, their pavilion, having a lot of English language programming and talks on broader climate change mitigation, not necessarily just the role of China, but a lot around cooperation and mutual engagement. And I think that also demonstrates what Richard has said about leadership and whether that's explicit or implicit. And I think that's pretty central to China's role.

RB: I think China's quiet leadership is not enough at this moment in time. And I think particularly with regard to accelerating a just energy transition, I think it should be doing more. But I can understand fully that quiet leadership, from Clare's perspective, is actually the kind of leadership that is appropriate for China at this moment, given also the experiences it's had within the climate negotiations. There are two interpretations of quiet there going on.

CRB: I totally agree. From a just transitions perspective, I mean, really from a mitigation and climate change adaptation perspective, it's not enough. Unfortunately, I think this is what we're going to see from China going forward.

NR: So where is global climate leadership coming from? Visible, active, urgent leadership? Did we see or hear anything either at COP or beyond that's given you a sense of hope that there is some of that happening?

RB: If I go back to what I saw as a defining profile of COP30 - in those two blocks, either pushing for roadmap for exit or not even wanting reference to fossil fuels within the final Mutirão decision, the political outcome of those two weeks – it's clear that someone like me is going to look to those countries that were in the coalition for going ahead with the roadmap. The EU was a very strong leader within that. The small island states were very strong. The vulnerable countries in Africa, despite the overall African Union position, which is much more for poverty reduction and therefore waiting things out. Vulnerable countries. They are leading. Leadership is not coming necessarily from big countries at the moment.

What's happened with the withdrawal, I think, of the US, but it's to be seen, and there's still a lot of uncertainty from the negotiations, and the kind of geopolitical world we're in, is we're going to see leadership, I think, emerge at various levels, and in various coalitions. And it's holding the coalitions that's going to be critical. That's why I was so concerned about lacking a coordinating mechanism. The US could sometimes do that. Sometimes it could sabotage it, but we don't have that global coordinating mechanism at the moment. We don't have it in terms of global governance, obviously, but we don't have it in terms of a country leading at the moment, because also China wants to be more quiet at this moment in time.

So I think we should be looking to coalitions and the leadership of those coalitions. And there, the really positive thing for me about COP30 was not only the number of countries in that coalition for the roadmap, but also the fact that Brazil assumed a very strong presidency. Even though it didn't get what it wanted to deliver on many fronts it did assume real climate leadership. And I think that promises a lot for its presidency for the coming year – because it has the presidency for the next year – and for the way it then hands over to Turkey and Australia for COP31.

CRB: I would just agree that we saw at COP30 that leadership is more distributed this year. We're in a really multipolar climate landscape, and so leadership is no longer owned by a single country. It's becoming a coalition of ambitious actors. And the way in which we saw mechanisms develop out of COP, many of which are still hanging in the air, and we don't know how those will actually be implemented, and who will ultimately be signed on to those. We're seeing leadership in a variety of different moving areas. So, for example, on finance, forests, mitigation, technology, etc.

NR: Here in the UK, we are also thinking about a just transition. Do you think there's enough recognition politically in the UK context as to how difficult it is to exit from fossil fuels and to move towards a greener future?

CRB: I think overall political courage is needed across the climate landscape and mitigation landscape. And in the UK, we're battling, when it comes to a just transition, two sides. There's a duality around economic development and economic success and a just transition and what that might look like. And that means making sure that all members of our economy and our society are being represented in that transition. And so that means involving workers and communities in decisions that affect them. It means sharing the benefits of the transition and then supporting those who risk losing out.

And there are some really stark examples in the UK of people that may lose out. For example, steel workers in the UK. There has been the closing of Tata Steel's arc furnaces in Port Talbot and a lot of discussion over the past year around what transitioning industry does to local communities and also does to industries that play a really integral part in the UK's economic development historically but also continued economic success. And so having political courage to acknowledge those challenges and then also take a holistic approach to how we address them is really needed. I think the UK is doing a lot of really great things in the climate space and the example of Tata Steel's transition towards cleaner steel or ‘green steel’ is a really important example. But the way in which that process played out is also a really good illustrator of how difficult this is and how many voices need to be included in the room.

RB: I'd want to put the national in an international context just as you're putting the international in the national context. I mean, it's both ways, isn't it? What we're talking about is the political economy of transition and that it is done in a fair way for as many as possible. And it's quite clear that if we fail in that, then there is a backlash and the backlash comes in forms of various reactionary populism. So we know the political agenda and we know the economic agenda. The dilemma is that unless countries of the north who are meeting real fiscal constraints at the moment and this populist backlash – we see it very, very clearly in the UK – unless we are able as a country to offer finance abroad, unless we do help countries that are more vulnerable than us and countries towards whom we do have a historical responsibility, unless we find a way of doing that, we're going to get a backlash from the south or rather we're going to get a continuing blockage with regard to what is required to get us to mitigation targets.

And in that therefore, we cannot separate adaptation and mitigation. We have to finance adaptation to the climate realities that are coming for the most vulnerable countries in the world and the UK has to be part of that. The dilemma is that if we can't do that, then the south will not be interested in moving forward to a transition away from fossil fuels. So that dilemma, without political legitimacy, northern countries cannot go forward and basically offer the climate finance that is needed for both mitigation and adaptation. And on the south, without having that credit from the north, countries in the south will not go towards a roadmap for fossil fuel exit. We have to solve that dilemma and that dilemma has to be solved by climate leadership. I think it is very difficult and the UK is absolutely stuck in that dilemma at the moment. I don't have a solution to it.

The way to do it, and it goes back partly to what Clare was saying, is to break things down into sectors. For example, in the UK, be absolutely clear where our subsidies should be going. Be absolutely clear that anything about getting to net zero is about creating communities who see the co-benefits in terms of health, in terms of job opportunity, in terms indeed of lesser migration into the country at this moment. Those co-benefits with a transition to renewable energies have to be seen very explicitly and owned by people, not simply prescribed in a regulatory way from above. Maybe through that we can begin to solve the dilemma that I refer to.

CRB: In the way that we talked about climate leadership being demonstrated at different levels at COP, there are also barriers nationally at different levels. We have local barriers, national political barriers, the overarching financial and sort of social legitimacy barriers. It's interesting the way in which those issues both internationally with the broader COP and then nationally mirror each other.

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There’s much more where that came from – listen to the full conversation here. You can also search for Planet Possible and Planet Possible Spotlight in your favourite podcast app for more interviews.